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Abstract—As the rapid proliferation of on-body Internet of
Things (IoT) devices, their security vulnerabilities have raised
serious privacy and safety issues. Traditional efforts to secure
these devices against impersonation attacks mainly rely on either
dedicated sensors or specified user motions, impeding their wide-
scale adoption. This paper transcends these limitations with
a general security solution by leveraging ubiquitous wireless
chips available in IoT devices. Particularly, representative time
and frequency features are first extracted from received signal
strengths (RSSs) to characterize radio propagation profiles.
Then, an adversarial multi-player network is developed to
recognize underlying radio propagation patterns and facilitate
on-body device authentication. We prove that at equilibrium, our
adversarial model can extract all information about propagation
patterns and eliminate any irrelevant information caused by
motion variances. We build a prototype of our system using
universal software radio peripheral (USRP) devices and conduct
extensive experiments with both static and dynamic body motions
in typical indoor and outdoor environments. The experimental
results show that our system achieves an average authentica-
tion accuracy of 90.4%, with a high area under the receiver
operating characteristic curve (AUROC) of 0.958 and better
generalization performance in comparison with the conventional
non-adversarial-based approach.
I. Introduction
With continuing advances in sensors and low-power com-
munication technologies, human-centric Internet of Things
(IoT) has gained increasing momentum in both industrial and
academic communities by unobtrusively providing smart user-
centered services [1], [2]. The hardware miniaturization of
IoT devices resembles the two sides of a coin: it empowers
IoT devices to communicate via ultra low-power radios while
making communication links vulnerable to malicious inva-
sions. Since on-body IoT devices are generally attached to
users’ bodies to continuously record fine-grained vital signs,
security breaches of these devices pose a serious threat to
users’ everyday privacy and safety [3].
Growing attempts and extensive endeavors have been de-
voted to thwarting malicious masqueraders for hardware-
constrained wearable devices. It has been shown that radio
channel characteristics in body area networks (BANs) can
be exploited to perform device authentication [4]. Recent
efforts have also leveraged dedicated sensors [5]–[8], such as
∗The corresponding author is Wei Wang (weiwangw@hust.edu.cn).
accelerometers and gyroscopes, to verify wearable devices.
However, hardly any of them have achieved widespread
acceptance. They limit themselves to either special motion
scenarios [4], or fitness related wearables [5]–[8]. To embrace
the coming wave of human-centric IoT, it is critical for a
device authentication solution to support various on-body IoT
devices under diverse user motions.
The salient physical layer (PHY) signatures underlying
different BANs present us with an exciting opportunity. In
BAN channels, off-body signals are mainly comprised of
line-of-sight (LOS) and multi-path components, while on-
body signals are governed by creeping waves [9], [10]. The
distinct radio propagation patterns potentially enable a general
security solution relying on prevalent wireless chips. However,
radio signals in BAN channels are severely affected by IoT
users’ body motions. As a consequence, on- and off-body
signals can exhibit significantly different patterns under a spe-
cific user motion, and their patterns tend to vary dramatically
across multiple motion states. Furthermore, users’ frequent
motion changes in daily life make it a highly challenging task
to manually select features to represent propagation patterns
from real-world radio traces.
To address this challenge, we propose a motion invariant
authentication framework for on-body IoT devices. The pro-
posed system performs device authentication by exploiting
BAN radio signatures in two steps. In the first step, our system
abstracts representative time and frequency features from
noisy received signal strength (RSS) segments to characterize
fine-grained radio propagation characteristics. In the second
step, to learn robust feature representations from abstracted
radio features, an adversarial multi-player network is cus-
tomized to effectively remove motion specific features and
thereafter accurately recognize the identities of IoT devices.
To achieve this goal, during training, an adversarial training
criterion is implemented, which leads to the emergence of
transferable features that generalize well in unseen motion
states. We implement a working prototype of our system
on universal software radio peripheral (USRP) devices and
conduct experiments with various body motions in different
real-world environments. Experimental results show that our
system achieves an authentication accuracy of 90.4% on
average.
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Fig. 1. On- and off-body radio propagations. On-body signals are dominated
by creeping waves, and off-body signals are mainly comprised of LOS and
multi-path components.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as
follows.
• We propose a general authentication system that supports
various on-body IoT devices under diverse body motions.
The crux of the proposed system is to construct reliable
radio propagation profiles from RSS segments and to
develop an adversarial network to essentially identify IoT
devices based on underlying propagation patterns.
• We theoretically analyze our adversarial multi-player net-
work and demonstrate that at equilibrium, the learned fea-
ture representation contains all information about BAN
radio propagation patterns, and becomes invariant to user
body motions.
• We build a prototype of our system on USRP plat-
form and conduct extensive experiments with various
frequently appearing body motions in a variety of in-
door and outdoor environments. The experimental results
demonstrate the effectiveness and generalizability of our
system.
II. Exploiting Distinct Radio Propagation Patterns between
On- and Off-Body Channels
Since the human body is basically a low-loss dielectric
at microwaves frequencies, including Wi-Fi and Bluetooth
frequency bands, radio propagation between a transmitter
(Tx) and a receiver (Rx) carried by a user is significantly
influenced by the user’s body. As shown in Fig. 1, off-body
links are dominated by LOS and multi-path propagations. On
the other hand, on-body links are governed by creeping waves,
which are diffracted by human tissues and spread out along
the human body [10]. Previous measurements [9] indicate
that creeping waves are rarely disturbed by multi-path fading
(small-scale fading) or large-scale fading caused by Tx-Rx
distance changes or shadowing, but are largely influenced by
body motions. Thus, we see that distinct propagation patterns
exist between on- and off-body signals.
Fig. 2 depicts the RSS and the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of different BAN signals that were collected
in standing and walking states, respectively. In the standing
state, we observe that on-body signals are more stable in the
time domain and off-body signals contain more components in
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(a) Signals in the standing state.
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(b) Signals in the walking state.
Fig. 2. RSS and CDF of on- and off-body radio signals in standing and
walking states.
the high frequency band. In the walking state, on-body signals
have a larger RSS variance and fall into a low frequency range
with a very high probability. The experimental observations
verify that differentiable propagation patterns exist in on- and
off-body channels in each motion state. This supports our
premise that we can rely upon PHY signatures to authenticate
various on-body IoT devices.
III. Adversarial Network Based Device Authentication
A. Design Rationale
It is, however, non-trivial to reliably capture propagation
patterns from real-world radio traces. As shown in Fig. 2,
although on- and off-body signals show distinguishable prop-
agation patterns in each case, their patterns are remarkably
different between the two cases. Consequently, an authentica-
tion model that is trained under a specific user motion will
typically not generalize well in different motion scenarios.
To deal with such dilemma, we resort to adversarial net-
works, which have recently surfaced as a popular tool to
discover transferable features in the deep learning field and
have proven their advantages in many real-world applications
[11]–[13]. Being a branch of deep learning approaches, ad-
versarial networks facilitate automatic extraction of complex
and latent feature representations by adopting a hierarchical
structure [14]. Different from traditional approaches, they have
the ability to find and exclude irrelevant features in the learned
representations with an adversarial training criterion.
Therefore, we can reap the benefits of adversarial networks
to recognize underlying on- and off-body propagation patterns.
In our application, a customized adversarial network can
be leveraged to autonomously extract feature representations
about BAN radio propagation patterns and selectively elimi-
nate motion specific features from the representations. To this
end, we propose an adversarial network based security system
to seamlessly authenticate various on-body IoT devices.
B. Design Overview
Our system takes advantage of an adversarial network
to extract distinct radio propagation patterns for on-body
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Fig. 3. System flow. The dashed gray block exists only in the training phase.
device authentication. Fig. 3 illustrates the framework of
our authentication system. It takes as input RSS time series
and outputs the corresponding device authentication results.
It is worth noting that to verify RSSs from various low-
end embedded IoT devices, our authentication system locates
at users’ smartphones, which have sufficient capability to
perform low-latency and accurate learning based inferences
[15].
The core of our authentication system includes two compo-
nents – Propagation Profile Characterization and Propagation
Pattern Recognition.
1) Propagation Profile Characterization. This compo-
nent first divides RSS time series into multiple basic
segments. Then, radio features are extracted from both
the time and frequency domains of RSS segments for
fine-grained characterization of potential propagation
patterns. Finally, the extracted features are integrated
into radio propagation profiles for future pattern recog-
nition by the adversarial network.
2) Propagation Pattern Recognition. Upon receiving a
propagation profile, the adversarial network first utilizes
a functional block to abstract a feature representation in
terms of on- and off-body propagations. Subsequently,
the model infers the identity of a connected IoT de-
vice through an on-off prediction block. Moreover, an
adversary block is added to eliminate motion specific
features in the feature representation in the training
phase. All blocks are learned through an adversarial
training process to promote the emergence of features
that are resilient to motion changes.
C. Propagation Profile Characterization
Signal Segmentation. Our system first partitions RSS
measurements into multiple segments. As an RSS segment is
the basic unit for device authentication, the segment interval
needs to be carefully determined. If the interval is too long,
on- and off-body signals will be probably both included in a
same segment. If it is too short, the system will be unable
to recognize any segment. We empirically find that a time
interval of 5s is capable of correctly differentiating over 90%
of on- and off-body IoT devices.
Time Domain Feature Extraction. Since on- and off-body
signals have different levels of impact from body motions,
large- and small-scale fading, we first decompose each RSS
segment into multi-scale variations by using filters. As creep-
ing waves are sensitive to body motions and their frequencies
fall into relatively low frequency bands with a high probability
[16], a band-pass filter is leveraged to extract motion-induced
variations. Based on our experimental observations, most
fluctuations caused by body motions fall between 0.5 Hz and
15 Hz. Variations in the residual low and high frequency bands
are also extracted by a low-pass filter and a high-pass filter,
respectively, as large- and small-scale variations.
With multi-scale variations, we select six time domain fea-
tures, including maximum, minimum, median, variance, kurto-
sis and skewness, to characterize propagation signatures from
each kind of variations. The maximum, minimum, median and
variance are chosen to describe the impact from the human
body, because dramatic body vibration typically contributes to
rapid changes in the maximum, minimum and median and also
results in a large variance. Kurtosis and skewness show the
symmetry and asymmetry of radio signals, respectively, and
can potentially capture propagation patterns due to the fact
that both symmetric and asymmetric components are richly
shared in radio waves. For finer-grained feature extraction,
we divide each kind of variations into ten chunks and extract
six features from each chunk. Therefore, a total of 180 feature
points are extracted to describe radio propagation signatures
from the time domain of an RSS segment.
Frequency Domain Feature Extraction. To abstract fre-
quency domain features, we start by performing Short-Time
Fourier Transform (STFT) on each RSS segment to obtain
its two-dimensional spectrogram. Specifically, with a signal
sampling rate of 500 Hz, we conduct a 1000-point Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT) within a 2s sliding window, shifting 1s
each time to make full use of sampling data. To summarize
information in the frequency domain, the frequency band
of each spectrogram, i.e., [0,250] Hz, is partitioned into
40 intervals, each of which is associated with a frequency
component of the segment. To effectively indicate propagation
signatures, we equally segment the low frequency band, i.e.,
[0,15] Hz, into 30 intervals and the residual high frequency
band into 10 intervals, and we sum up the magnitudes in
each interval in every FFT result. In this way, we transform a
two-dimensional spectrogram into a 4×40 matrix M. Then we
take two frequency domain features from M: the component
magnitude (or each element in M) and the proportion of
each component (PC), such that PC( j) =
∑4
i=1 M(i, j)∑40
j=1
∑4
i=1 M(i, j)
, where
j = 1, · · · , 40. Finally, a total of 200 feature points are
extracted from the frequency domain of an RSS segment.
D. Propagation Pattern Recognition
We formulate the propagation pattern recognition as a
binary classification task, where X ⊆ Rn is the sample space
andY = {0, 1} is the target label set. In our context, each x ∈ X
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Fig. 4. Our adversarial multi-player network and corresponding adversarial
training criterion. The model encompasses three blocks – a Feature Extractor
E, an On-Off Predictor P and a Motion Discriminator D.
is a radio propagation profile sample, and y ∈ Y indicates the
corresponding on- or off-body IoT device. Moreover, for each
x, z ∈ {1, 2, · · · , nz} denotes an auxiliary label that refers to
the body motion that x is sampled from.
We develop an adversarial multi-player network for prop-
agation pattern recognition. As depicted in Fig. 4, our model
encompasses three blocks – a Feature Extractor E, an On-
Off Predictor P and a Motion Discriminator D. Since simply
wiping out all dependencies between feature representations
and domains (e.g., motions in our application) could degrade
the accuracy of target label prediction, our model adopts a
conditional adversarial architecture [12] for better generaliza-
tion performance.
Feature Extractor E. An extractor E is the front block of
the adversarial model. It takes as input a propagation profile
x and returns a latent feature representation as E(x).
On-Off Predictor P. A predictor P acts as the end block
of the model. It takes as input a learned feature representa-
tion E(x) and outputs a two-dimensional probability vector
Py(·|(E(x))) in terms of on- and off-body devices.
Motion Discriminator D. A discriminator D serves as an
adversary in our model in the training phase. It takes a fea-
ture representation E(x) and the associated on-off probability
vector Py(·|E(x)) together as input, and discriminates which
motion state x is sampled from as Dz
(
·∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))).
Adversarial Training. Before performing authentication,
our adversarial model needs to be trained on training data,
which follows the distribution qtrain(x). We define the loss
of P as the cross-entropy between Py (·|E(x)) and the true
posterior target label distribution qy(·|x) over qtrain(x), which
is given as
LP(P, E) , Ex∼qtrain(x)Ey∼q(y|x)
[− log P (y|E(x))] . (1)
Similarly, the loss of D is defined as the cross-entropy between
Dz
(
·∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) and the true conditional distribution
qz(·|x) over qtrain(x), which is expressed as
LD (D, E; P) , Ex∼qtrain(x)Ez∼q(z|x)
[
− log D
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x)))] .
(2)
Note that to effectively learn parameters of our multi-player
model, the flow from P to D is a one-way link (i.e., the black
arrow line in Fig. 4), along which gradients don’t propagate
back. Thus, the parameters of P are not updated through the
optimization of the loss LD.
To robustly authenticate IoT devices under diverse body
motions, it is critical for our model to implement an adversar-
ial training criterion. The basic idea is that to generalize well
in unseen scenarios, a predictive model must discriminate well
between on- and off-body devices, but it cannot distinguish
body motions associated with input samples. To achieve this
goal, we use minimax games between E, P and D in the
training phase. Particularly, E plays a cooperative game with
P to minimize the loss LP. At the same time, E and D together
play a minimax game, where D aims to minimize the loss LD
and E tries to maximize it.
We integrate the above objectives into one value function:
V (E, P,D) ,LP(P, E) − λ · LD(D, E; P), (3)
where λ > 0 is hyperparameter. With the value function
(3), the adversarial training criterion can be implemented by
optimizing the following minimax problem:
min
E,P
max
D
V (E, P,D) . (4)
E. Theoretical Analysis of Adversarial Model
We prove that the output of our adversarial model becomes
invariant to motion changes through the adversarial training.
Specifically, we first present the optimal predictor and optimal
discriminator in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, respectively,
without proving them, and refer the reader to [12] (Propo-
sition 2) for details. Then, we illustrate the virtual training
criterion, optimal extractor and optimal output, respectively, in
Corollary 1, Proposition 3 and Corollary 2. Differing from the
theoretical efforts in the prior work [12], our analysis focuses
on a practical adversarial model.
Proposition 1: (Optimal predictor) For a fixed extractor E,
the output of the optimal predictor P∗ over qtrain(x) achieves
P∗ (y|E(x)) = q(y|E(x)), (5)
and the loss of P∗ is
LP∗ (E) , min
P
LP(P, E) = H(y|E(x)), (6)
where H(·|·) denotes the conditional entropy function.
Note that given E, the equality (5) indicates the maximal
predictive capability that a predictor P can learn from qtrain(x).
Proposition 2: (Optimal discriminator) Given any extractor
E and any predictor P, the optimal discriminator D∗ over
qtrain(x) obtains
D∗
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) = q (z∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) , (7)
and its loss is
LD∗ (E; P) , min
D
LD(D, E; P) = H
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) . (8)
With the optimal predictor and optimal discriminator, we
proceed to simplify the minimax training criterion (4).
Corollary 1: (Virtual training criterion) If P and D have
enough capacity and are trained to be optimal over qtrain(x),
the minimax optimization (4) is equivalent to the minimization
of a virtual value function V(E), which is expressed as
V(E) , H (y|E(x)) − λ · H
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), qy(·|E(x))) . (9)
Proof: Considering the optimal predictor P∗ in Proposi-
tion 1, we can rewrite the loss of the optimal discriminator
D∗ in Proposition 2, by substituting (5) into (8), as
LD∗ (E) = H
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), qy(·|E(x))) . (10)
According to the losses of the optimal predictor (6) and
optimal discriminator (10), the initial value function (3) can
be simplified as the virtual version (9). Thus, optimizing the
minimax optimization (4) equals to minimizing V(E).
Then, we obtain the optimal extractor by minimizingV(E).
Proposition 3: (Optimal extractor) If E, P and D have
enough capability and are trained to be optimal over qtrain(x),
any optimal extractor E∗ satisfies
H (y|E∗(x)) = H (y|x) , (11)
and
H
(
z
∣∣∣E∗(x), qy(·|E∗(x))) = H (z∣∣∣qy(·|E∗(x))) . (12)
Proof: When E is fixed, LP∗ (E) = H (y|E(x)) ≥ H(y|x)
and LD∗ (E) = H
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), qy(·|E(x))) ≤ H (z∣∣∣qy(·|E(x))). There-
fore, we obtain a lower bound of V(E), that is
V(E) ≥ H(y|x) − λ · H
(
z
∣∣∣qy(·|E(x))) . (13)
Since the bound is achieved if and only if both the conditions
(11) and (12) hold, proving that any optimal extractor E∗
satisfies (11) and (12) is identical to proving the equality
V(E∗) = H(y|x) − λ · H
(
z
∣∣∣qy(·|E∗(x))).
We note that the lower bound is achievable by considering
a special case, where E∗(x) = qy(·|x), an extractor with the
best representative ability. In this case, we can check that
V(E∗) = H(y|E∗(x)) − λ · H
(
z
∣∣∣E∗(x), qy(·|E∗(x)))
= H(y|x) − λ · H(z|qy(·|E∗(x))). (14)
Remark 1: Proposition 3 indicates that when all blocks are
trained to be optimal and our adversarial model reaches equi-
librium, the extractor E is able to extract all information about
y from the training samples and eliminate any information
about z except what is also related to y.
Corollary 2: (Optimal output) If E, P and D have enough
capacity and are trained to be optimal over qtrain(x), the output
of our adversarial model achieves
Py(·|E(x)) = qy(·|x), (15)
and
Dz
(
·∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) = qz(·|qy(·|x)). (16)
Proof: Based on Proposition 1, P (y|E(x)) = q(y|E(x)).
According to Proposition 3, H (y|E(x)) = H (y|x), which
implies that q(y|E(x)) = q(y|x). Hence, P(y|E(x)) = q(y|x).
When P and D are optimal, the equality (10) holds,
that is D
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) = q (z∣∣∣E(x), qy(·|E(x))). Accord-
ing to Proposition 3, the equality (12) holds, which is
equivalent to q
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), qy(·|E(x))) = q(z|qy(·|E(x))). Then,
by considering P(y|E(x)) = q(y|x), we achieve the equality
D
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) = q(z|qy(·|x)).
IV. Evaluation in Real Environments
A. Experimental Methodology
Implementation. We build a proof-of-concept prototype
of the proposed system with three GNURadio/USRP B210
devices, which work at 2.4 GHz with a sampling rate of 500
Hz. Furthermore, two USRP devices are placed on a volunteer,
referred to as a legitimate user, and are considered to be
two on-body devices. The left device is situated on another
volunteer, referred to as a malicious attacker, and is regarded
to be an off-body device.
Data Collection. We collect radio traces in both controlled
and uncontrolled user motion scenarios. In the controlled
scenario, the user is confined to five frequently appearing
motions, which are comprised of two static motions, sitting
and standing, and three dynamic ones, arm moving, rotating
and walking. In the uncontrolled scenario, the user is permitted
to behave casually. In both scenarios, the attacker is allowed
to move freely in the vicinity of the user to try to fool
the legitimate devices. Moreover, to verify the robustness of
our system under various environments, we collect wireless
signals in five indoor and outdoor settings, i.e., a lab, a
meeting room, a corridor, a rooftop and a park. We conduct
the experiments over seven days and collect a total of ten
hours of radio traces.
Dataset. Our dataset includes a total of 7200 samples
that are extracted from collected radio traces. Therein, 6000
samples are from the controlled user motion scenario, and
1200 are from the uncontrolled scenario. When evaluating
our model, we randomly take out 4800 samples from the
controlled scenario for training and combine the leftover 1200
ones and all 1200 samples from the uncontrolled scenario for
testing. Additionally, in both the training and testing sets, the
numbers of on- and off-body samples are equal.
Parameterization. As shown in Fig. 4, we parameterize
our multi-player model as a deep neural network. Specifically,
the feature extractor E is a convolutional neural network with
eight convolutional layers to abstract latent feature represen-
tations from input samples. Furthermore, the on-off predictor
P and the motion discriminator D are configured with three
fully-connected layers to facilitate their own predictions.
Evaluation Metrics. We use the following metrics to
illustrate the performance of our system.
• Accuracy. It is computed as the ratio of the number of
RSS segments that are correctly recognized to the total
number of on- and off-body RSS segments.
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Fig. 7. TP and FP rates for different body motions.
• True positive (TP) rate. It is denoted as the ratio of
the number of on-body RSS segments that are correctly
predicted to the total number of on-body segments.
• False positive (FP) rate. It is defined as the ratio of the
number of off-body RSS segments that are mistakenly
accepted to the total number of off-body segments.
B. Performance Results
We first illustrate the overall performance of our authenti-
cation system on all testing data. As shown in Table I, our
system is able to identify 90.4% of on- and off-body devices
on average. Specifically, it can correctly recognize on-body
devices with a ratio of 89.0% and successfully mitigate 91.8%
of attacks from off-body devices. In addition, we report the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve of our system,
which depicts the tradeoff between FP and TP rates by varying
their discrimination threshold in the interval [0, 1]. As depicted
in Fig. 5, the system’s ROC curve first goes straight up and
then becomes steady promptly as FP rate increases. Moreover,
the area under the ROC curve (AUROC) reaches 0.958, which
is close to 1, i.e., the AUROC of the ideal case. The above
results indicate that our system achieves good authentication
ability.
TABLE I
Overall Performance Results
Accuracy TP Rate FP Rate
90.4% ± 1.9% 89.0% ± 2.4% 8.2% ± 1.7%
Then, we elaborate on the authentication performance for
each frequently appearing motion. In general, each motion
has a unique movement pattern of the human body, and thus
exhibits different effects on BAN radio waves. As plotted
in Fig. 6, the proposed system achieves better performance
for the static motions than for the dynamic ones. The same
observations are also shown in Fig. 7. Therein, higher TP
rates and lower FP rates are clearly present in the static
states, because there are fewer disturbances caused by body
movements in radio signals when the user sits or stands still
with IoT devices, which makes it much easier for the system
to recognize on- and off-body propagation patterns. Despite
the above differences, the system still achieves average TP and
FP rates of 90.8% and 6.9%, respectively, in the controlled
user motion scenario.
Next, we compare the system performance in the uncon-
trolled scenario with that in the controlled one. As illustrated
in Fig. 8, the system shows performance degradation in
each metric in the uncontrolled scenario. The reason for
the degradation is that more irregular and complicated body
movements are present when the user behaves casually, which
causes the extractor to extract more noisy features and thus
hampers the prediction ability of the predictor. More specif-
ically, the system has a TP rate reduction of 4.0% and a
FP rate increase of 2.6% for uncontrolled motions. This is
due to the fact that, compared with off-body signals, on-body
signals, dominated by creeping waves, are more sensitive to
user motion dynamics, which results in more on-body RSS
segments to be mistakenly classified as off-body ones.
We further illustrate the benefits of adopting an adversarial
discriminator in our multi-player model. Our discriminator
aims at helping the extractor to discover transferable features
and thus boosts the generalization ability of the predictor. To
illustrate these merits, we set up a version of our model with
a non-adversarial discriminator as a baseline. Note that in the
baseline, the update of the extractor’ parameters relies solely
on the minimization of the predictor’s loss.
Fig. 9 plots the training losses of discriminators in our and
baseline models. The loss of the non-adversarial discriminator
declines quickly and then stabilizes at a very low level. How-
ever, ours first fluctuates dramatically and finally converges to
a high value. This is due to the fact that at the beginning, the
fluctuations of the adversarial loss are incurred by its minimax
optimization, and they mitigate gradually as motion specific
features irrelevant to the predictor fade out in the feature rep-
resentation. The above observations reveal that the extractor
in our model abstracts more transferable features than that in
the baseline. Furthermore, comparing the performance of two
predictors in Fig. 10, we see that both loss curves decrease
at first and then increase after certain numbers of iterations.
However, the adversarial curve rises up at a lower speed than
the non-adversarial one, which suggests that our adversarial
discriminator works as a regularizer for alleviating over-fitting
and enables the promotion of the predictor’s generalization
ability.
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Fig. 8. Performance comparison between the
controlled and uncontrolled user motion sce-
narios.
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Fig. 9. Training losses of discriminators for ad-
versarial and non-adversarial models. The lower
the value is, the more information pertaining to
body motions a discriminator can learn.
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Fig. 10. Testing losses of predictors for adversar-
ial and non-adversarial models. The rise of loss
curves is due to the over-fitting phenomenon.
V. Related Work
Dedicated sensors, including accelerometers [5],
bioimpedance sensors [7], motion sensors [17] and capacitive
touch sensors [8], have been used to differentiate on- and off-
body devices. Additionally, various sensors in smartphones
[18], [19] have been also exploited to identify devices or
users. However, sensor-based approaches limit themselves to
specified user motions or fitness related wearables.
Existing measurements [9], [10] have shown that essential
differences exist between on- and off-body radio propagations.
Based on the above studies, radio propagation characteristics
were examined to identify legitimate wearable devices [20]. In
comparison to the prior work, our work develops a customized
adversarial network to essentially extract underlying propaga-
tion patterns and obtains a better generalized authentication
performance in various motion scenarios.
VI. Conclusion
This paper presents a motion invariant authentication sys-
tem to secure on-body IoT device pairing and data trans-
mission by harnessing an adversarial multi-player network to
effectively recognize underlying radio propagation patterns.
Our system takes one step forward to embrace the advent
of human-centric IoT by supporting various wearable devices
under diverse user motions. Our theoretical analysis indicates
that at equilibrium, our adversarial model is resilient to motion
variances. We extensively evaluate the proposed system with
various static and dynamic user motions in indoor and outdoor
settings. The results shows that our system can recognize
89.0% of legitimate devices while at the same time mitigating
91.8% of impersonation attack attempts.
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